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15.1  Introduction 
Female-headed families are a large and growing proportion of all fam- 
ilies. Special concern for this population stems from the limited amount 
of resources available to the family unit. Divorce almost always results in 
a decline in the level of living for all parties involved, but the decline is 
larger for women than for men (Hoffman 1977). Female-headed families 
make up a disproportionate share of the poverty population and many 
have little choice but to rely upon the welfare system (Bradbury et al. 
1979). 
Between 1970 and 1981 the number of married-couple families increased 
only 10.1 percent while the number of female-headed families increased 
62.4 percent, so by 1981 over 15 percent of all families were headed by a 
woman only (US.  Bureau of the Census 1982, table 60). This rising rate 
of female headship is of  special concern in part because female-headed 
families have lower incomes and are more likely to be classified as poor 
than are married-couple families. In 1980 the median income of married- 
couple families was $23,180 compared to $10,830 for female-headed fam- 
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ilies (US. Bureau of the Census 1982, table 717). Of the 6.2 million fam- 
ilies with incomes below the poverty level in that year, almost 3 million 
were female headed (U.S.  Bureau of the Census 1982, table 739, a phe- 
nomenon recently dubbed the “feminization of poverty.”’ Female head- 
ship also may be of  special concern because of  the large number of chil- 
dren involved. Between 1970 and 1980 the number of children living with 
two parents  (not necessarily their  natural ones) declined 20.6  percent, 
while the number living with one parent (overwhelmingly  their mother) in- 
creased 67.1 percent. By  1982, 15.3 percent of white and 47.2 percent of 
black children lived with only their mothers (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 
1983, p. 5). For most this is a temporary arrangement, since a large major- 
ity of divorced women remarry. However, it has been estimated that “chil- 
dren born in the mid-1970s have about 45 chances in 100 of living in a one- 
parent family for a period of at least several months before they reach the 
age of 18 years.” (Glick and Norton 1977). 
Most mothers with children from an absent father head their own fam- 
ilies at least for a time. Figure 15.1 shows the distribution by household 
status in April 1979 of mothers aged eighteen and over with children (un- 
der twenty-one years of  age) from an absent father.* Of these 6.4 million 
mothers,  5.5 million had previously been married to the child’s father, 
while 0.9 million had not. Among the ever married,  3.5 million are di- 
vorced or separated: 3.2 million of these head their own families and 0.3 
million live as subfamilies with parents or other relatives. Another 2.0 
million are remarried and 54 thousand are widowed after remarriage. 
Among the never married, most head their own families. In this chapter, 
we focus on the two largest of these groups, divorced or separated moth- 
ers heading their own families and remarried mothers, excluding the wi- 
dowed.’ 
We  investigate variations in several key components of the economic 
well-being of ever-divorced or currently separated mothers with children 
from an absent father. In large measure, the economic well-being of  a di- 
vorced mother depends upon the amount of family support (child support 
and alimony) she receives from her ex-husband, her labor force participa- 
tion, and how quickly she remarries, if at all. Whether family support is 
received or not and how much is received is subject to  considerable uncer- 
tainty, both in amount and regularity of  payments.  Because many di- 
vorced mothers are awarded child support while few are awarded ali- 
1. National Organization of Women president, Judy Goldsmith, New York  rimes, 1 Sep- 
2. The  idea for this figure comes from Bradbury et al. 1979. 
3.  Subfamilies pose special problems of income sharing that we cannot readily handle. 
Never-married mothers differ in significant ways from ever-married mothers and thus must 
be considered separately. Women who are widowed after remarriage form a small group 
whose economic position may depend more upon their current circumstances than upon 
having been divorced. 










































Fig. 15.1.  Mothers eighteen and over with children from an absent father 
in 1979: number of women (in thousands); average total family 
income; percentage in poverty; percentage receiving child 
support; labor force participation rate. Source: Tabulations by 
authors from the computer tapes of the March/April Match 
File of  the 1979 Current Population Survey. 
mony, we shall devote much more attention to the former. A divorced 
mother is more likely to participate in the labor force than a married 
mother, since her earnings become crucial to the family’s economic status. 
She also can seek to improve the position of her family by searching for a 
new mate to regain the economic well-being lost by divorce. One unique 
aspect of our study is that we pay particular attention to the effects of 
child support and alimony upon the probabilities of remarriage and labor 
force participation. 
Figure  15.1 presents four measures of well-being for each household 
status group: average total family income; the percentage of  families in 
poverty; the percentage of families receiving child support; and the labor 
force participation rate of mothers.  In terms of economic status, ever- 
married are  better off than never-married mothers, and remarriage clearly 
improves economic status. While the total family income of divorced (or 474  Andrea H. Beller/John W.  Graham 
separated) mothers is only $9,678 and 36.2 percent of them live in poverty, 
family income of  remarried mothers is $23,044 and only 5.6  percent of 
them live in poverty. The low economic position of currently divorced 
compared to remarried mothers occurs despite a higher proportion who 
receive child support (43.9 compared to 39.0 percent) and participate in 
the labor force (73.3 compared to 60.6 percent). These figures portray 
strong economic incentives for divorced mothers to remarry. 
The data set upon which these population estimates are based and from 
which our sample is drawn is the March/April 1979 Match File of the Cur- 
rent Population Survey (CPS) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1981b). Data 
on marital status, divorce history, and child support and alimony were 
collected on all women eighteen years of age and older in a special supple- 
ment to the April  1979 CPS. A file was created containing these data 
along with the income information from the March 1979 CPS. This file 
contains 1,579 currently divorced or separated female family heads and 
1,005 remarried mothers. Population estimates for all mothers eligible for 
child support and alimony as well as descriptive analyses of them are pre- 
sentedin U.S. Bureau of the Census (1981a).4 
A divorced mother will be better off if she is awarded and receives child 
support, if  she participates in the labor force, and/or if  she remarries. 
Women who are awarded child support are better off than those who are 
not, and their income is higher by more than the amount of child support 
received. In our sample,  the total personal  income in  1978 of  women 
awarded child  support was  $7,970, of  which child support comprised 
$1,115. For those not awarded child support, total personal income was 
$5,568. The difference is even greater between those who received child 
support and those who did not. Total personal income of those who re- 
ceived child support in 1978 was $9,425 while for those who did not it was 
$5,742. The average amount of child support received for those who re- 
ceived any was $1,901, much less than the difference in income. Women 
who participate in the labor market have higher personal income and re- 
ceive more child support than those who do not. In 1978 the average per- 
sonal income of currently divorced or separated mothers who worked out- 
side the home was $9,632, while for those who did not it was $4,197; if 
they worked, they received $998 in child support, but if they did not, only 
$570. As shown in figure 15.1 above, although remarriage improves the 
economic well-being of  divorced mothers the most, it appears to be asso- 
ciated with less child support received-$1,683  compared to $2,021 for 
currently divorced or separated mothers. 
An important question raised by these figures is whether child support 
payments have a direct causal effect upon the decision to work and/or re- 
4. The population estimates published in that report differ slightly from the ones we report 
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marry, or whether the observed association is simply simultaneously de- 
termined by  other factors.  To examine the interrelationships between 
child support and these other components of economic well-being, we 
postulate the theoretical model presented in section 15.2. Based upon that 
model, we examine in section 15.3 what factors influence the award and 
receipt of  child support. Then in sections 15.4 and 15.5 we  examine the 
impact of child support payments (holding constant other factors) upon 
remarriage and upon labor force participation, respectively. 
15.2  Theoretical Framework 
Before turning to our empirical work, we offer a short sketch of the the- 
ory upon which our analysis is based. We posit the following recursive sys- 
tem: 
(1)  CSDUE =  fl(H1,  W1,  LI). 
(2)  CSREC = f2(H2,  w2, Lz,  CSDUE). 
(3)  RM = g[  Yd  (CSRECd, . . . ), Y,  (CSREC,, . . . ), C]. 
(4)  LFd  = k[  Wh(CSRECd, . . . ), W,,  VdCSRECd, . . .  )]. 
The first equation says that child support due (CSDUE)  is a function of  a 
vector of  characteristics of the ex-husband’s ability (and desire) to pay 
(HI),  the financial needs of the woman and children (Wl),  and the legal 
environment at divorce (L’). The second equation says that support actually 
received (CSREC)  depends upon the same three vectors of variables (H2, 
WZ, and L2)  as well as upon the amount of support due. We  label these 
vectors with different superscripts to suggest that they may contain some- 
what different elements from those in the first equation. For example, W1 
may measure the judge’s perception of the woman’s needs, while w2 mea- 
sures the ex-husband’s perception of her needs. A priori w2 could depend 
in part upon the woman’s current marital status (RM),  but in our empiri- 
cal work we offer evidence that this effect is limited. Past work (Gordon, 
Jones, and Sawhill 1978; Cassetty 1978) finds that the effect of H2  upon 
CSREC is particularly strong where H2  refers to the absent father’s cur- 
rent financial status, measured perhaps by his current income or current 
employment  status. L2 includes child support enforcement  laws which 
vary from state to state. 
5.  Equation (1) might be viewed as a reduced form expression derived from equilibrating 
the mother’s demand for with the absent father’s supply of child support, where equilibrium 
is attained through either private negotiation or the court system. Viewed this way, one could 
investigate determinants of  these demand and supply functions such as other anticipated 
sources of support (including alimony and property settlements) and the tax treatment of 
these alternative income sources. However, we choose not to pursue this line as  our data are 
better suited to analyzing the reduced form than the structural equations. 476  Andrea H. Beller/John W.  Graham 
Equation (3) states that the probability a divorced woman remarries 
(RM)  depends negatively upon her real income (monetary plus nonmone- 
tary) while divorced (Yd),  positively upon her expected real income if re- 
married (  Y,), and negatively upon the costs of marital search (C). Since 
child support payments are supposed to continue even after a woman re- 
marries, CSREC enters both Yd  and Y,,  although a priori we allow expect- 
ed receipts to vary with marital status (CsRECd and CSREC,). Ceteris 
paribus, an increase in child support payments will reduce the expected in- 
crease in income from remarriage (because, although portable, child sup- 
port payments are a larger fraction of  Yd  than of  Y,), but will raise the 
woman’s attractiveness to potential marriage partners. Therefore, the net 
impact of child support on remarriage is ambiguous. It should be noted 
that public assistance benefits may be another important component of 
The final equation states that the probability a divorced woman is in the 
labor force (LFd)  depends negatively upon the value of her time at home 
(wh),  positively upon the value of her time in the market ( Wm),  and nega- 
tively upon nonlabor income (vd), which itself depends upon child sup- 
port payments (CSREcd). If  a woman useq  child support payments to 
purchase for her children market goods that can be substituted for her 
home time, then wh  may depend negatively upon CSRECd. In this case, 
the net effect of an increase in CsRECd on LFd  is ambiguous: it raises vd 
which reduces LFd, but it lowers wh which raises LFd. 
To summarize, economic theory cannot determine the net impact of 
child support payments on either the probability of remarriage or the 
probability of labor force participation. Instead, this remains to be deter- 
mined by empirical analysis. 
yd  * 
15.3  Empirical Analysis of Child Support 
Child support payments are in many cases an uncertain and inadequate 
source of income to divorced mothers. In this section we examine what 
factors determine whether a woman is awarded child support, and then, 
given its award, whether she actually receives it as well as how much she 
receives. Our study significantly improves upon previous studies of child 
support (Cassetty 1978; Gordon, Jones, and Sawhill 1978; and Sorensen 
and MacDonald 1981) by separating the question of award from receipt 
and by using a large national data set that samples the entire eligible popu- 
lation. 
Excluding observations with missing values, our sample consists of up 
to 2,416 ever-divorced or currently separated women (eighteen years of 
age or over) with children (under twenty-one years of age) from an absent 
father. There are 389 black women and 2,027 nonblack, of which 7 per- 
cent are of Spanish origin. At divorce or separation, 72.6 percent of these 
women were awarded child support-77.5  percent of nonblacks and 47.6 477  Economic Well-Being of Divorced Women and Their Children 
percent of blacks.6 For those who were due payment in 1978 the average 
annual amount due was $2,028.’ Of these, 71.4 percent received partial or 
full payments  averaging $1,899. While the large majority of those due 
support received at least partial payment, 45.4 percent reported receiving 
no payments or irregular payments. Means and standard deviations for 
various characteristics of this sample are summarized in the appendix, ta- 
ble 15.A.1. 
In this section, we estimate determinants of  the award and receipt of 
child support for currently divorced or separated and remarried women.  * 
Because black women are much less likely than nonblack women to be 
awarded child support, we estimate the determinants of award probability 
separately by race. However, in analyzing the receipt of child support, we 
combine blacks and nonblacks because too few blacks are awarded child 
support to permit separate analy~is.~  The variables used in the regression 
equations are defined in the appendix, table 15.A.2. 
15.3.1 
Child Support 
Child support awards may be either court ordered or informally agreed 
to, although even most voluntary agreements are formalized through legal 
contracts. Our theoretical analysis postulates .that child support is more 
likely to be awarded the greater is the perceived need of the woman and 
children and the greater is the ability (or desire) of the absent father to pay. 
The probability of award also depends upon the legal environment at di- 
vorce which varies from state to state and over time, and may vary within a 
state across legal jurisdictions, as well as across individual judges. There is 
some evidence that in states with no-fault  divorce, the amount of child 
support awarded is lower than in states without no-fault divorce (Peters 
1982). For our sample we have only some of the desirable information on 
the needs of the mother and on the ability of the father to pay, and no in- 
formation on the legal environment.I0 
Determinants of  the Probability of  Being Awarded 
6. Black mothers are significantly less likely to be awarded support even after controlling 
for other factors. 
7. Around 17.2 percent of all mothers-16.8  percent of nonblacks and 21.6 percent of 
blacks-awarded  child support were not due any in 1978 for a variety of reasons such as 
death of the previous spouse and children past the age of eligibility for support. 
8. In separate regression equations we found no  systematic differences between them in 
the estimated coefficients. 
9. Equations estimated for the nonblack sample alone are nearly identical to those for all 
races combined, with the notable exception that the black intercept dummy is usually signifi- 
cant in the combined sample. 
10. It would be especially desirable to have some direct information on  the financial cir- 
cumstances of the father at the time of  divorce. For our sample, it is not possible to find a 
simple measure of the legal environment at divorce because the divorce year varies from 1945 
to 1979. Ten percent of the sample were divorced in 1965 or earlier and 29 percent in 1970 or 
earlier. We could not in any case account for the individual variation from  judge to  judge in a 
study at the national level. For a study that takes account of such variation in a single state, 
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Let P be the probability that child support is agreed to or awarded con- 
ditional upon a woman being ever divorced or currently separated. Then 
the logistic function 
(5)  P = 1/(1 + e-Bx-u) 
was estimated by maximum likelihood methods, where Xis a vector of in- 
dependent variables and P a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Table 
15.1 presents the estimated partial derivatives of  P with respect to each 
variable, found by multiplying the estimated @s  byP(1 -P),  whereP is the 
mean of the dependent variable. 
Variables that may reflect the new  family’s financial need include the 
mother’s age at divorce (AGEDZV),  education (EDUC and COLLGRAD), 
number of children by the absent father (PATERNR)  and age of the chil- 
dren (KID6TOI  7).  While no direct information is available on  the father’s 
financial status at the time of divorce, his ex-wife’s age (at divorce) and 
education will be positively correlated with his own and, consequently, 
with his ability to pay. Another proxy for his ability to pay is the value of 
the property settlement reached in the divorce proceedings (SETVAL).  Fi- 
nally,  geographic  location  variables  (NEAST, NCENTR,  SOUTH, 
SMSA, and CC)  may control for some of the variation in the legal envi- 
ronment that we are unable to capture. 
It is important to distinguish divorced from separated (SEP)  women in 
our sample. Fourteen percent of the nonblacks are currently separated, 
while 48 percent of the blacks are separated. Separated women may but 
are less likely to be awarded child support. According to our estimates, ce- 
teris paribus, separated nonblack (black) women are 21 (29) percent less 
likely than comparable divorced women to have been awarded child sup- 
port. 
For  nonblacks,  the probability  of  being  awarded child  support in- 
creases as the number of  dependent children increases (PATERNR),  by 
4.1 to 4.7 percent per child, and as one or more of these children tends to 
be older (KZD6TOl7).  For the black sample, however, neither variable is 
significant. 
EDUC is positive for both groups but significant only for nonblacks. In 
addition,  the dummy variable COLLGRAD is  negative and significant 
for nonblacks, suggesting that college-educated women are between 2.5 
and 5.0 percent less likely than otherwise similar high school graduates to 
be awarded child support. As noted above, EDUC may serve both as a 
proxy for ex-husband’s lifetime earnings potential and as a measure of the 
new  family’s financial needs.  Although  more education may enable a 
woman to support the children herself, thereby reducing needs, it also 
raises the standard of living to  which the family is accustomed, thereby in- 
creasing needs. The positive sign on EDUC may reflect both this second 
effect as well as her ex-husband’s ability to pay, while the negative coeffi- 479  Economic Well-Being of Divorced Women and Their Children 
Table 15.1  Child Support Award Probability 
Nonblack  Black 
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Notes: Table represents all ever-divorced or currently separated women, age eighteen 
and over, with children under twenty-one years of age from an absent father, as of spring 
1979. 
The logistic function P = l/(1 + e-px-") w_as estimated bymaximum likelihood methods 
and the coefficients reported above are pP(1 -  P)  where P is the mean of the dependent 
variable reported in the last row of the table. Asymptotic t-values  are shown in parentheses. 
"SPANISH was omitted from the equation for blacks because less than 1 percent of the 
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cient on COLLGRAD may reflect the competing effect of less need for 
support. 
The coefficient on the woman’s age at divorce (AGEDZV is positive for 
both races and significant for blacks. In part, her age is again a proxy for 
her ex-husband’s ability to provide support. (It appears to be a better 
proxy for income of black ex-husbands than is her education.) But in ad- 
dition, the variable is strongly positively correlated with the duration of 
the marriage.” Longer marriages may be more likely to result in child sup- 
port awards for several reasons. Chief among them is that the father is 
likely to be more attached to his children and therefore more disposed to- 
ward providing them support. A longer duration of marriage might also 
suggest that the woman has invested more in this marriage,  developing 
greater marriage-specific capital (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977), and 
specialized more in home activities, developing less human capital valued 
in the market. Thus, she would be less able to support the children. 
In neither racial sample of ever-divorced women is current marital sta- 
tus (REMAR)  significant. This result is important in that it suggests that 
women who have remarried do not possess some unobserved traits that 
made them systematically more or less likely to be awarded child support 
at the time of their divorce. 
For a slightly smaller sample of women, we were able to include an in- 
dex of the value of property settlements (SETVAL)  as a proxy variable for 
the financial well-being of the couple before divorce. Since property set- 
tlements and child support awards are determined together,  the coeffi- 
cient on SETVAL may be biased if  any unobservable factors that affect 
the  value  of  property  settlements  also  affect the  probability  of  being 
awarded child support. To the extent that SETVAL is a good proxy, its sig- 
nificant positive coefficient for both racial groups reinforces the hypo- 
thesis that father’s ability to pay (and the original family’s standard of liv- 
ing) is  a  strong  determinant  of  child  support awards.  Note that  the 
inclusion of  SETVAL reduces the coefficients on EDUC and AGEDZV, 
other proxies for father’s ability to pay. 
For the sample of all women both awarded child support and expecting 
to receive it in 1978, we estimated equations on factors determining the 
amount due (results not shown). With a few notable exceptions, factors 
that determine whether or not child support is awarded also affect the 
amount due. Few child support awards are automatically indexed to the 
rising price level (Krause 1981, p. 24), and most are infrequently renegoti- 
ated; thus, we  controlled  for  the  number  of  years  since the  divorce 
(YEARSDZV)  and found its coefficient to be negative and significant. We 
11. We also estimated this equation for the sample of  currently divorced (or separated) 
women only for which we know marriage duration (DURMAR).  When we enter DURMAR 
as an independent variable in place of AGEDIV, its coefficient is positive and significant for 
nonblacks, but insignificant for blacks. 481  Economic Well-Being of Divorced Women and Their Children 
also introduced as an explanatory variable the woman's estimate of her 
ex-husband's  current income (HUSZNC); this considerably reduces the 
sample size because many women do not know HUSI".'*  While the re- 
sults from this smaller sample may be biased because of this self-selection, 
the means of the independent variables (reported in table 15.A.1) change 
very little from the full sample. We  found the coefficient on HUSZNC 
positive and significant, suggesting that each additional $5,000 in the ab- 
sent father's 1978 income raises child support due by $219. The coefficient 
on EDUC declines in size, but remains significant, suggesting that EDUC 
stands for more than just his current ability to  pay. We have argued that it 
serves as a proxy for his lifetime earnings potential upon which the sup- 
port award is likely to be based. It may also indicate a higher standard of 
living to  which the family is accustomed. 
15.3.2  Determinants of the Probability of Receiving Child Support and 
of the Amount Received 
Not all women due child support actually receive it. Of those expecting 
payment in 1978, only 71.4 percent received any. Moreover, those who re- 
ceive it frequently receive less than what is due. Among women receiving 
some support, the mean receipt was $1,899 out of the $2,204 due them, 
around 86 percent. In this section we  offer some evidence that the prob- 
ability of actually receiving child support, unlike its award, depends less 
upon the needs of the woman and more upon the current financial status 
of her ex-husband. 
This problem consists of two related issues: first, whether a divorced 
mother receives any child support and second, how much she receives. 
This second issue introduces the possibility of sample selection bias: esti- 
mates of the determinants of support received may be biased if some omit- 
ted factors that determine whether the woman gets into the sample (i.e., 
receives any child support) also determine how much she receives. To cor- 
rect for this sample selection bias, we use a technique developed by Heckman 
(1979) that eliminates the bias by introducing a new independent variable 
X  (negatively related to the probability of receiving child support) into the 
regressions on amount of child support received. Using maximum likeli- 
hood probit, first we estimate determinants of the probability of receiving 
any child support in 1978, conditional upon some payment being due. Es- 
timated partial derivatives of these factors are presented in columns (1) 
through (3) of table 15.2. Next we use the probit estimates to compute a 
12. This variable is believed to be subject to considerable measurement error, which would 
increase its standard error. However, since the variable is measured in increments of $5,000, 
we believe that it provides a reasonably good indication of relative magnitudes of incomes 
among ex-husbands. If the woman knows what kind of job her ex-husband holds and whether 
or not he is employed, she should have a rough idea of  what he earns, which is good enough 
for our purposes. Tbble 15.2  Receipt and Amount of  Child Support 
Amount of  Child Support Received 
for Those Who Received Any  Probability of  Receiving Child Support 
(1)’  (2)’  (3)’  (4)5  (5)5  (6)5 
BLACK  -  .lo1  -  .123  -  .043  -  299  -  259  -  56 
(2.69)  (3.03)  (0.73)  (2.49)  (1.70)  (0.38) 
(0.61)  (0.38)  (1.39)  (2.83)  (3.02)  (3.60) 
(2.36)  (2.23)  (1 .99)  (1.30)  (1.71)  (0.84) 
(1.85)  (2.12)  (2.83)  (0.67)  (0.05)  (1.08) 
(1.43)  (1.50)  (1.55)  (1.58)  (0.90)  (0.88) 
(0.70)  (0.54)  (1.35)  (0.66)  (0.29)  (0.77) 
(0.32)  (0.36)  (1.84)  (1.30)  (1.29)  (0.26) 
SPANISH  -  .030  -  .020  -  .lo4  -  346  -  406  -  926 
NEAST  .082  .081  .094  177  170  107 
NCENTR  .055  .065  .110  -  50  -5  -  139 
SOUTH  .042  .047  .060  -  114  -71  -90 
SMSA  -  .018  -  .015  -  .o45  39  18  -  67 
cc  .010  .012  .079  90  95  30 
EDUC  .015  .016  ,013  0.2  6  -  22 
AGE  .027  .022  .005  59  67  59 
AGESQ  -  .0003  -  .om2  -  .o001  -  0.6  -  0.1  -0.6 
PATERNR  -  .012  -  .026  -  .022  18  -  13  83 
OTHERKID  -  .079  -  ,069  -  .087  89  49  140 
KILMTOI 7  .066  .087  ,072  -64  -  20  -  253 
(2.87)  (2.89)  (1.90)  (0.02)  (0.36)  (1.12) 
(2.66)  (2.05)  (0.46)  (1.95)  (2.27)  (2.03) 
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CSVOL  .222  .221  .155  173  27 1  -  31 
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(1.59) 
-  ,020 
(6.94) 
-  .008 
(0.30) 
-  .039 
(1.40) 
-  .020 
(5.88) 
-  .005 
(0.17) 
-  .012 
(0.48) 
- 




-  .028 
(0.80) 
-  198 
-7 




-  204 





-  123 
-  41 
























-  1,Ooo 
















-  1,199 
(1.51) 
.877 
-  1,547 
(1.88) 


















Nore: Figures are for ever divorced or currently separated women due child support in 1978. 
aThe  coefficients reported in these columns are the probit maximum likelihood  estimates (p) multiplied by the sample mean of normal density functions 
evaluated at X&,  where XI  is the vector of independent variables for the P observation. These sample means are .297 for col. (l), .280 for col. (2), 
and .232 for col. (3). 
bX = f(x,p)/F(X&),  where f  and F are, respectively, the density and distribution function for a standard normal variable, and X,  and p are defined 
as in footnote a. See Heckman 1979, p. 156. 
%ince we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selection bias (i.e., that the coefficient on  A is zero), the usual OLS standard errors and t-statistics 
are appropriate. See Heckman 1979, p.  158. 484  Andrea H. Beller/John W.  Graham 
A-value  for each mother who receives any child support and enter it in 
OLS regressions on amount of child support received, holding constant 
the amount due.’3  These results appear in columns (4) through (6) of table 
15.2. Because previous researchers did not explicitly recognize the possi- 
bility of sample selection bias, their regression results on factors affecting 
child support received may be biased (see, for example, Cassetty 1978). 
Ex post, we find only limited evidence of sample selection bias: the co- 
efficient on  X is insignificantly different from zero in both columns (4) and 
(5) and only significant at a 10 percent level in column (6). The negative 
sign on X in column (6) indicates that omitted factors that lower the prob- 
ability of receiving child support (and therefore increase X) also lower the 
amount received. 
Black women are less likely to  receive child support and, when they do, 
receive less than nonblack women, even after controlling for the lower 
amount they are due. However, these differences become insignificant for 
blacks who know their ex-husband’s income. Although women of Span- 
ish  origin  are equally  likely  to receive  child  support as  non-Spanish 
women, they receive significantly less child support. The coefficient on 
SPANISH becomes even more negative for those few who know their ex- 
husband’s income. 
EDUC, AGE, and AGESQ may serve as proxies for the absent father’s 
ability to pay.  Education has a positive impact on the likelihood of  pay- 
ment but not on the amount. Advancing age increases both the probabil- 
ity of  receiving payment and the amount paid at a decreasing rate (remi- 
niscent  of  the  manner  in  which  earnings  change  with  age).  When 
HUSINC is included, these proxies for ability to  pay become insignificant 
or less significant in the probability of receipt equation (col. 3), but age re- 
mains significant in the equation on the amount received (col. 6). Al- 
though HUSINC significantly increases the likelihood of payment, it has 
no  significant effect  upon  the  amount  paid  once  we  control  for the 
amount due. Thus, we conclude that while the absent father’s income is an 
important determinant  of the amount of  child support awarded  (each 
$5,000 increment raises the amount by $219) and of whether or not he 
pays anything, it is not an important determinant of  the portion of the 
award that he pays. This suggests that fathers with negative transitory in- 
come are likely to evade the support obligation altogether rather than pay 
a smaller portion of the amount due.  l4 
13. The sample means (and standard deviations) for these X variables are as follows: 





14. In a separate regression, we included child support due (CHSUPDUE)  as an explana- 
tory variable. Holding HUSZNC constant, its coefficient is small but significantly positive: 
each additional $100 of support due increases the probability that some support will be re- 
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Three measures of  the impact of children are included. Holding con- 
stant the length of time since the divorce (YEARSDIV), having older chil- 
dren (KIDdTOZ 7)  increases the probability of receiving support, consis- 
tent with the hypothesis that absent fathers are more likely to pay support 
for children whom they lived with longer. As the number of children due 
support increases (PATERNR),  the probability that support will be paid 
appears to decline although this effect is significant only in the equation in 
column (2). This result is difficult to explain. If the woman has other chil- 
dren not fathered by her most recent ex-husband (OTHERKID), this sig- 
nificantly reduces by 7 to 9 percent the probability that he pays child sup- 
port. This result is more understandable. Given the amount due, neither 
the number nor ages of the children affects the amount of  support re- 
ceived, except in the sample that knows HUSINC. This group (col. 6) re- 
ceives $83 more for each additional child but $253 less for older children, 
another result that is difficult to explain. 
Women were asked whether their child support awards were court or- 
dered or agreed to voluntarily. Those reporting voluntary  agreements 
(CSVOL)  are between 15 and 22 percent more likely to receive payments; 
however, given the amount agreed to, the effect of CSVOL on the amount 
received is positive but insignificant. Apparently voluntary initial agree- 
ment, which probably indicates something about the character of the fa- 
ther or of the relationship, has lasting effects. 
If the marriage that ended in divorce was not the woman's first, her 
likelihood of receiving payment is reduced for each higher-order marriage 
(NUMMAR)  by around 8.5 percent, at least when controlling for her ex- 
husband's  income. Moreover, she receives up to $204 less support per 
higher-order marriage, controlling for the amount due. This is especially 
interesting in light of the finding that women in higher-order marriages 
seem to negotiate somewhat higher support awards (results not shown). 
Absent fathers reported by their ex-wives to have other children to sup- 
port (HUSCHD)  are no less likely to pay child support. While new chil- 
dren may reduce his ability to  support absent ones, the father's decision to 
remarry and have more children suggests he values family life and is apt to 
be more conscientious about providing support for his absent ~hi1dren.I~ 
tively to the amount of  child support awarded, then the significance of  both CHSUPDUE 
and HUSZNC in the same regression could indicate that his permanent income (CHSUPDUE) 
and current income (HUSZNC) have separate effects upon his probability of paying support. 
Holding current income constant, absent fathers with higher permanent income are some- 
what more likely to pay support. Holding permanent income constant, fathers with higher 
current income are much more likely to pay support. Again this is consistent with the hy- 
pothesis that current ability to pay has a strong impact upon child support payments. 
15. Cassetty 1978 found that absent fathers who remarried were no more likely to pay 
child support, but paid significantly more. Since she does not control for amount due, her 
findings on  amount received confound determinants of  award amount with receipt amount, 
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Because of  these competing effects, the insignificance of HUSCHD  does 
not disturb our hypothesis that the probability of receiving child support 
is largely a function of the absent father’s ability to pay.16 
The variable  YEARSDIV  has a significant negative effect upon the 
probability of receiving child support, but not on  the proportion received. 
Each additional year since the divorce reduces the probability of receiving 
support by approximately 2 percent. This relationship appears to be lin- 
ear. The absent father may be less likely to pay support with each passing 
year if he loses physical or emotional contact with his children. (We have 
no information on whether he has visitation rights.) This explanation is 
reinforced by noting that the coefficient on YEARSDIV  is much smaller 
in magnitude for the sample of women who know HUSINC,  women who 
may be presumed not to have lost complete contact with their ex-husbands. 
Whether the woman is remarried (REMAR)  does not affect her likeli- 
hood of receiving any child support, but does appear to lower the amount 
she receives by up to $159, except for those (remarried) women who know 
HUSINC. This suggests that when his ex-wife remarries, the absent fa- 
ther may reduce somewhat the amount of child support he pays, but not 
attempt to renegotiate the amount due (REMAR  is insignificant in the 
equation on amount due-results  not shown), nor stop paying altogether 
(REMAR  is insignificant in cols. 1 through 3 of table 15.2). However, an- 
other  possibility  is  that our regression suffers from reverse causality: 
women who receive less of the support they are due may be more likely to 
remarry. We examine this possibility in the next section. 
15.4  Empirical Analysis of  Remarriage 
The majority of women in the United States who divorce eventually re- 
marry. For example, in the 1979 CPS, 70 percent of divorced mothers re- 
married  within fifteen years of their divorce. This identical remarriage 
rate for divorced women was found in the 1967 Survey of Economic Op- 
portunity (SEO) data by Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977). In the CPS, 
one-half of all mothers remarried within five years of their divorce, and 29 
percent within two years.’* 
16. Another reason why this coefficient is insignificant may be that this variable is mea- 
sured with error. 
17. Our results would appear to disagree with those of Cassetty 1978 which finds that re- 
married women are less likely to receive child support and also receive less child support. 
However, Cassetty’s dependent variable combines child support and alimony income together. 
Since alimony stops with remarriage while child support is supposed to continue, her results 
would inevitably be negatively biased. We are fortunate to have data that enable us to sepa- 
rate child support from alimony income. 
18. In the 1967 SEO, only 43 percent of women remarried within five years and 22 percent 
within two years. Either divorced mothers remarry more rapidly than divorced women in 
general or there has been a secular trend since 1967 toward shorter intervals between divorce 
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The modern theory of job search has recently been applied to marital 
search by, among others, Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) and Hutchens 
(1979).  Briefly, the probability of remarriage depends upon a woman’s 
own search behavior and upon her attractiveness to potential marriage 
partners.  A  divorced woman can decide whether or not to engage in 
search, how intensively  to  search, and how long to search. These decisions 
depend upon her expected gain from remarriage, which is a function of 
her expected future flow of real income if single compared to her distribu- 
tion of offers of real income if remarried, net of search costs. A divorced 
woman’s distribution of offers will depend upon her attractiveness to po- 
tential mates, which will be a function of some characteristics we can ob- 
serve such as age, some we cannot observe such as charm or beauty, and 
the amount of “marital-specific” capital (investments that are significantly 
less valuable when divorced, such as children) from her previous mar- 
riage. As Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977, p.  1155) point out, “posi- 
tive” specific capital in one marriage may be “negative” specific capital in 
a subsequent marriage. 
Some factors affect her search behavior and her attractiveness to others 
in opposite directions making it  difficult to determine their  net  effect 
upon the probability of remarriage a priori. One example is a woman’s 
portable (carries into marriage) nonwage income. A higher income if sin- 
gle would reduce the gain from remarriage, which might cause a woman 
to choose not to search or to search less intensely and longer. However, it 
also enhances her attractiveness to potential spouses, causing an increase 
in the mean of the offer distribution. This would tend to increase her prob- 
ability of participation in search and have an indeterminant  impact on inten- 
sity and duration of search (Hutchens 1979, p. 371). Hutchens cites Becker’s 
theoretical analysis (1973, p. 891) as evidence that the latter effect tends to 
dominate the former. Thus, greater portable nonwage income is expected to 
increase both the probability of participation in and the duration of search. 
The presence of children is another factor with competing effects. The 
greater the number of children, ceteris paribus, the greater the economic 
gain from remarriage; thus, the woman is likely to set lower standards for 
a new husband and to search more intensely. However, this greater specific 
capital from the previous marriage also reduces her attractiveness to po- 
tential marriage partners, which decreases the number and mean value of 
marriage offers. 
We hypothesize that women will remarry quickly if they are either un- 
usually attractive to potential mates or have established a low “reserva- 
tion” set of characteristics for a new husband. Similarly, women will take 
longer to remarry (or never remarry) if they are either less attractive part- 
ners or have set a higher standard for a new husband. 
We related the probability of remarriage by the nth year after termina- 
tion of the previous marriage (n = 2, 5, 10, and 15) to the expected gain 488  Andrea H. Beller/John W.  Graham 
from remarriage. We selected our sample so that all women were divorced 
(excludes separated) at least n  years.  (Thus, each successive sample is 
smaller than the previous  We estimated a logistic function for each 
sample by maximum likelihood methods. Results for the n = 15 group are 
not shown because that sample contains less than 150  observations and be- 
cause most of these women had remarried by n = 10. Partial derivatives of 
the logistic function with respect to each independent variable, evaluated at 
the sample mean, for divorce durations of two, five, and ten years are re- 
ported in table 15.3. 
A higher age at divorce (AGEDIV)  significantly  reduces the probability 
of remarriage of divorced mothers at all three durations. The increase in 
the size of the coefficient with each successive duration suggests that age 
at divorce becomes an increasingly important determinant of remarriage 
probabilities at higher durations, possibly because it reduces a woman’s 
attractiveness as a marriage partner. The greater her number of previous 
marriages (NUMMAR),  the less likely a woman is to remarry, holding 
AGEDIV constant. Ceteris paribus, a greater number of previous mar- 
riages might reduce her attractiveness to potential marriage partners or 
her inclination to try again. This effect also becomes larger at higher dura- 
tions. 
We might expect to find a secular rise in the probability of  remarriage 
because the divorce rate has been increasing, which makes available a 
greater pool of potential mates and reduces the stigma associated with be- 
ing a divorced woman. Indeed, we find that for durations of five and ten 
years, given AGEDIV, the more recent the divorce (the lower YEARSDIV), 
the more likely is a woman to remarry. This effect is significant in the re- 
gressions in columns (3) and (5). 
As discussed above, a greater number of children (PATERN.)  will have 
the competing effects of raising search intensity but lowering potential 
marriage offers. (The former effect may be mitigated by the fact that a 
greater number of children probably increases her costs of search and re- 
duces her need for additional companionship.) We find that the probabil- 
ity of remarriage within two years of divorce (col. 1) increases as the num- 
ber of children increases to between two and three and decreases thereafter. 
The woman may have set her reservation standard low in order to remarry 
quickly for her children’s sake, but too many children make it difficult to 
attract offers. At  higher durations, the effect is linear: each additional 
19. This structure is partly longitudinal in nature because we have marital histories for all 
divorced women, and partly cross-sectional because women who are recently divorced fall 
into the samples only for the shorter time intervals. Thus, this sequence of  remarriage prob- 
abilities cannot be viewed precisely as the experience of a given cohort at two, five, or ten 
years after their divorce. Women divorced only two years today may behave differently by 
five years after divorce than women who today are already five years beyond their divorce. 
Within each equation, we control for differences in length of time since divorce, which 
should control for this cohort effect. lhble 15.3  Probability of  Remarriage, by Duration of Time  Since the End of  Previous Marriage 
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child reduces the probability of remarriage within five years by 3.9 per- 
cent (col. 2) and within ten years by 9.6 percent (col. 4). When we control 
for child support due per child (PCCSDUE),  the coefficient on PATERNR is 
still negative and significant at both durations. This suggests that what is 
unattractive about a greater number of children is more than just the cost 
of caring for them. The increase in the size of the coefficient on PATERNR 
with increasing divorce duration suggests that the woman’s attractiveness 
as a marriage partner becomes an increasingly important determinant of 
remarriage the longer she has been divorced. 
Alimony is nonportable income; that is, it stops with remarriage. As 
such, it should have a negative effect upon the probability of remarriage. 
AWARDAL is negative at all divorce durations, becomes larger at higher 
durations, but is significant only at ten years in the regression controlling 
for child support due (col. 5). Women awarded alimony are 8.2 percent 
less likely to have remarried five years after divorce and 16.2 percent less 
likely ten years after. This finding is consistent with findings by Hutchens 
(1979, p. 377) that nonportable transfers tend to reduce remarriage prob- 
abilities. Unfortunately, this is the only information about alimony we 
have that is relevant to the remarriage decision. 
Child support income is legally portable between the single and married 
status. As such, it has the competing effects discussed above of decreasing 
the gain from remarriage but of increasing the woman’s attractiveness to 
potential mates; therefore, theoretically its effect upon remarriage is inde- 
terminate. Where Hutchens (1979, p. 377) was unable to draw any conclu- 
sions on the relationship between portable nonwage income and remar- 
riage, we are able to do so. Two  additional considerations make it likely 
that child support income will decrease the gain from remarriage more 
than other income. First, if  a divorced mother spends child support in- 
come on  the children, in part on goods and services substitutable for child 
care time, then it reduces the benefits to be derived from the sexual divi- 
sion of labor in the care of children. Second, although legally portable, in 
practice child support income may be only partly portable. We showed in 
table 15.2 that for otherwise identical women due the same amount of 
child support annually, remarried women receive up to $159 less than di- 
vorced women. If  fully anticipated, this reduction in payments would 
serve to further reduce the expected gain from remarriage. 
Women awarded child support (AWARDCS)  are 5.3 percent less likely 
to remarry within the first two years after divorce, but this effect is signifi- 
cant only at the 10 percent level (col. 1). If not awarded child support, a 
woman stands to gain a great deal more from a quick remarriage than a 
woman awarded support. Consequently, she may search more intensely 
and set lower standards for a new husband. 
In the equations of columns (3)  and (3,  we add measures of whether 
child support was due in 1978 (CHSUP78)  and of the amount of child sup- 492  Andrea H. Beller/John W.  Graham 
port due per child (PCCSDUE).20  Women awarded child support and had 
it due to them in 1978 were 3.9 percent less likely to have remarried five 
years after the termination of their previous marriage and 11.1 percent 
less likely ten years after than women not awarded child support. For 
those awarded and due child support in 1978, each additional $500 due 
per child reduces the probability of  remarriage within five years by 4.2 
percent. Within ten years, the effect is smaller and statistically insignifi- 
cant, but this may be due to the high correlation between CHSUP78 and 
PCCSDUE in this sample. On net, child support income reduces the gain 
from remarriage more than it increases the woman’s attractiveness to po- 
tential mates, probably because several factors work in this direction. 
Thus, we conclude from these findings on child support that this type of 
portable nonwage income reduces the probability of remarriage. 
Holding constant whether and how much child support is due in 1978, 
AWARDCS becomes positive and significant. Women awarded child sup- 
port but due none in 1978 (around 20 percent of the sample) are 18 to 19 
percent more likely to remarry than women not awarded support, even 
though women both awarded and due support are less likely to remarry. If 
a woman is due child support or due more support, she searches longer be- 
fore remarrying and may not remarry at all. But if her child support in- 
come stops,  she is  much more likely to remarry than if  it were never 
awarded at all. 
Two other variables that have the competing effects of  reducing the 
woman’s gain from remarriage but of increasing her attractiveness to oth- 
ers are her  wealth  at divorce  (SETWL) and  her  education  (EDUC). 
SETML is insignificant in all regressions; EDUC is consistently negative, 
but significant only at the 10 percent level for durations of  two and five 
years. 
AFDC and other public assistance benefits available to single mothers 
are other important forms of  nonportable income that would reduce the 
gain from remarriage and prolong the duration of divorce. Because re- 
marriage occurs in many different years in our sample, we have no simple 
measure of  the relevant public assistance benefits when each woman was 
deciding upon remarriage.*’ However, some of our variables may be inter- 
preted as proxies for the likelihood a divorced woman received AFDC. 
20.  Theory would suggest that the relevant variable in the decision to remarry is dollars of 
child support (or alimony) received when divorced.  But this variable is not available for 
women who have remarried. For remarried women, the best proxy for child support received 
when divorced is child support due now, since most child support awards are rarely renegoti- 
ated; for currently divorced women, child support due and child support received are corre- 
lated 0.88. 
21. Had we restricted our sample to remarriages that took place within say the last two 
years instead of  n years after divorce, we could have included measures of  AFDC (as did 
Hutchens 1979). But for the problem we are interested in, our specification (similar to that of 
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For example, by five years after termination of the marriage, black women 
(BLACK) are 32, percent less likely to have remarried than similar non- 
black women. If black women, women in the northeast (NEAST) or in 
central cities (CC), and women with many children are somewhat more 
likely AFDC candidates than other women, then our results support pre- 
vious findings (Hutchens 1979) that welfare reduces the probability of re- 
marriage. 
15.5  Empirical Analysis of Labor Force Participation 
Although differences in female labor force participation rates have nar- 
rowed recently, unmarried women are still more likely to be in the labor 
force than married women.  Among our sample of  1,503 currently di- 
vorced or separated mothers, 73.9 percent were either working or looking 
for work in March 1979, compared with 60.3 percent of our sample of 936 
remarried mothers. The greater labor force attachment of divorced moth- 
ers is an obvious response to their loss of other family income. In this sec- 
tion we examine factors affecting the variation in labor force participation 
rates among divorced mothers, paying special attention to the influence of 
family support-child  support and alimony. 
The probability of labor force participation should depend negatively 
upon the value of a woman’s time at home, positively upon the value of 
her time in the market, and negatively upon nonlabor income. The pres- 
ence of  younger children or more children raises her time value at home, 
while education and job experience raise her value more in the market 
than in the home. In addition, if market work imposes fixed entry costs, 
then a woman may elect not to participate unless her desired hours of em- 
ployment exceed some critical minimum. And since hours of work depend 
negatively upon nonlabor income, a ceteris paribus increase in such in- 
come should reduce the likelihood a woman  participates  in the labor 
force. For divorced mothers, most nonlabor income consists of  income 
from property, earnings of other family members, public welfare, and ali- 
mony and child support payments from her ex-husband. 
In contrast to the other sources of nonlabor income, child support pay- 
ments might exert an additional and opposite influence upon labor force 
participation.  Since this income is  awarded to support the children, a 
woman may feel explicitly or implicitly constrained to spend it entirely on 
goods and services for them. If these commodities (such as day care for 
small children) can substitute for her own home time, then she may be 
able to reduce her hours of work in the home and raise her desired hours 
of  employment beyond the critical minimum required for labor force en- 
try. If this occurs, then the net impact of child support payments on labor 
force participation is ambiguous. On the one hand, child support has an 
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Table 15.4  Likelihood of  Labor Force Participation of  Currently Divorced (or 
Separated) Women, March 1979 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
BLACK  -  .085  -  .076  -  .076 
(2.31)  (2.05)  (2.06) 
SPANISH  -  .lo1  -  .lo3  -  .I05 
(1.99)  (2.02)  (2.06) 
(3.36)  (3.28)  (3.25) 
NCENTR  -  .027  -  .030  -  .033 
(0.70)  (0.78)  (0.84) 
SOUTH  .015  ,028  .025 
(0.30)  (0.53)  (0.47) 
SMSA  .021  .019  .019 
(0.60)  (0.54)  (0.55) 
cc  -  .062  -  .057  -  .059 
(1.73)  (1.58)  (1.62) 
KIDLT3  -  .127  -- .128  -  .128 
(3.21)  (3.22)  (3.23) 
KIDLT6  -  .063  -  .062  -  .062 
(2.19)  (2.13)  (2.16) 
KIDLTl8  -  .026  -  .025  -  .025 
(1.81)  (1.75)  (1.72) 
NUMMAR  -  .037  -  .033  -  .040 
(1.27)  (1.17)  (1.38) 
EDUC  .053  .053  .052 
(8.72)  (8.79)  (8.76) 
NADULT  .044  .045  .044 
(1.75)  (1.76)  (1.73) 
AGE  .023  .023  .024 
(2.33)  (2.25)  (2.35) 
(2.57)  (2.43)  (2.52) 
NEAST  -  .130  -  .127  -  ,126 
AGESQ  -  .0003  -  .0003  -  .0003 
therefore reducing the probability of labor force participation. On the 
other hand, child support has a substitution effect of increasing the quan- 
tity of goods devoted to children, decreasing the amount of time spent on 
them, and therefore raising the likelihood of labor force participation. 
Table 15.4 reports estimated partial derivatives from logistic models on 
factors affecting the likelihood of labor force participation in March 1979 
for our sample of divorced mothers.22  All three variations contain the 
same economic and demographic variables but different child support 
and alimony variables. The coefficients on the common set of indepen- 
dent variables change very little across functional forms. 
22.  We also estimated equations with labor force participation for any part of  1978  as the 
dependent variable. The results-particularly  on the child support and alimony variables- 
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Table 15.4 (continued) 
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Note: See table  15.1, second paragraph of Notes. 
The pattern of coefficients on the number of children under eighteen 
years by age groups is consistent with findings from studies for married, 
spouse-present women (Smith 1980). Compared with having at home one 
child  age  eighteen to twenty,  having  one  child  age  six to seventeen 
(KIDLTZ8)  reduces the probability of participation by 3 percent; having 
one child age three to five (KIDLT6) reduces participation another 6 per- 
cent; and having one child under three (KIDLT3) reduces participation 
another 13 percent. Small children raise the value of the woman's home 
time and reduce her likelihood of labor force entry. Each additional adult 
in the household (NADULT) who might share in child care duties in- 
creases her labor force participation by up to 4.5 percent. 
As the woman becomes more valuable in the market, her labor force 
participation increases. Each additional year of education (EDUC)  raises 
her entry probability by over 5 percent. Advancing age (and presumably 
experience) raises entry at a declining rate (AGE is positive and AGESQ 
is negative).  Finally,  women  who  have  been  divorced a longer  time 496  Andrea H. Beller/John W.  Graham 
(YEARSDZV) are less likely to enter the job market. This result appears 
counterintuitive if labor market entry is viewed as one possible way to re- 
store economic well-being lost at divorce (where remarriage is another 
possible way). One explanation consistent with this result is that mothers 
who are likely candidates for public assistance and therefore less likely to 
be working remain divorced (or separated) for a longer time than do other 
mothers to maintain their eligibility. Alternatively, this result may reflect 
the secular trend toward rising labor force participation among younger 
(more recently divorced) women. 
Black women (BLACK) are around 8 percent and women of Spanish 
origin (SPANZSH)  around 10 percent less likely to  participate in the labor 
force than other divorced mothers.  This may reflect cultural differences 
and/or  discrimination  against  minority  women  in  the  labor  market. 
Women in the northeast (NEAS7')  are 12 to 13 percent less likely than other 
women to participate, while women in central cities (CC) are 6 percent 
less likely to participate. Since women with these characteristics make up 
a disproportionate share of the AFDC population, these results also sug- 
gest that an increased likelihood of being on public assistance reduces la- 
bor force participation,  findings consistent with those of other studies 
such as Keeley et a1 .  (  1978). 
AFDCMAX equals the maximum amount of monthly AFDC payments 
that a woman with a given number of children in a particular state could 
receive if  she does not work (and has no other income) as of  July 1978. 
(Data on AFDCMAX were obtained from U.S.  Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare 1979.) In other words, it represents potential, not 
actual, welfare benefits. Generous public assistance benefits, ceteris pari- 
bus, should be expected to reduce labor force participation. Our finding 
indicates that each additional $100 per month in benefits reduces the like- 
lihood of  labor force participation by around 5 percent. When these po- 
tential benefits are replaced by actual benefits received, the regression fits 
even better but it then suffers from an obvious simultaneity bias.23 
As expected,  the coefficient on other family income excluding child 
support, alimony, and public assistance (OTHFZNC) is negative and sig- 
nificant; each additional $1  ,OOO  in annual income deters labor market en- 
try by slightly more than 1 percent. The coefficient on amount of alimony 
due (ALZMDUE) is also negative and significant, but each additional 
$1,000 of  alimony deters entry by  2.7 percent (col.  1). Controlling for 
whether  or not  alimony  is  due in  1978  (ALZM78), the  coefficient on 
amount received (ALZMREC)  is virtually identical to  the one on  ALZMDUE 
(col. 2). One reason that alimony appears to reduce participation more 
than other income is that its coefficient may be biased downward. Women 
23.  In  addition, the size and significance of  the  coefficients on BLACK,  SPANISH, 
NEAST, CC, KIDLT3, KIDLT6, KIDLT18, and YEARSDIVare reduced. This is consistent 
with our notion that each of these variables serves in part as a proxy for the probability of go- 
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awarded alimony are probably less likely to  have worked in the labor mar- 
ket during their marriage and thus, with less previous job experience, less 
likely to be working now. Therefore, the coefficient on alimony may re- 
flect both an income effect and an “experience” effect.24 
Unlike alimony, child support income appears to be positively associated 
with labor force participation. This is consistent with past work demon- 
strating a positive simple correlation between labor force participation 
and the receipt of child support (Grossman and Hayghe 1982), but ex- 
tends it by showing that even when other characteristics (such as race, age, 
education, and family size) are held constant, the positive association per- 
sists. The coefficient of  .oooO305  on CHSUPDUE (col. 1) indicates that 
among women due child support in 1978, one who is due the average 
amount (slightly over $2,100) is 6.4 percent more likely to participate in 
the labor force than an otherwise identical woman due no child support. 
Furthermore, each additional $1  ,OOO  of support due raises participation 
by 3.0 percent. The positive sign is consistent with our hypothesis that child 
support payments are used to purchase goods and services that substitute 
for mother’s home time and thus facilitate her labor force participation. 
In columns (2) and (3) we  enter alternative measures of child support 
due and/or received. Women due child support in 1978 (CHSUP78)  are 11 
to 14 percent more likely to participate in the labor force than women not 
due support. One reason why this effect appears so large is that the coeffi- 
cient on CHSUP78  may be biased upward. At divorce, women who antici- 
pate future labor force participation may seek to obtain child support, 
which is nontaxable income, instead of alimony, which is taxable. Once we 
control  for  whether it  is  due,  the amount  of  child support received 
(CHSUPREC) has no significant additional effect on participation (col. 
2). However, for the 58 percent of divorced mothers due child support in 
1978 who received it regularly (CSREGULR),  the difference in labor force 
participation over women due no support is 6.1 percent less, but this effect 
is insignificant (col. 3). This suggests that the uncertainty created by re- 
ceiving child support payments on an irregular basis may cause a greater 
increase in the labor force participation of divorced mothers than if pay- 
ment were regular. 
15.6  Summary and Conclusions 
In this section we summarize our most important findings and discuss 
their implications for the formation of public policy. Also, we  suggest 
promising directions for future research. 
24. However, for a sample of  recently divorced (or separated) mothers for whom we are 
able to control for whether or not they were in the labor force prior to the termination of 
their marriage (in March 1975). the coefficient on alimony due is virtually identical to the 
one reported here, suggesting that the “experience”  bias may be negligible for this particular 
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Like other forms of  nonlabor income, child support payments were 
found to lower the probability of remarriage. But unlike other forms of 
nonlabor income, child support payments were found neither to raise nor 
to lower labor force participation. Each of these findings is consistent 
with our hypothesis that child support income serves as a substitute for 
the absent father. If  a divorced mother receives child support, her eco- 
nomic incentive to remarry is reduced. This allows her to increase the du- 
ration of marital search which should improve the quality of the match 
and thus the likelihood that the new marriage will last. In addition to these 
long-run benefits, child support payments do not deter a divorced wom- 
an’s labor force participation, which raises her family’s income and well- 
being in the short run. Thus, child support payments are found to have 
both immediate and future benefits. 
It is interesting to contrast the effects of child support, a private trans- 
fer, with AFDC payments, a public transfer. Previous work (Hutchens 
1979) has found that AFDC reduces remarriage rates, just as we  found 
that child support does. Other previous work (Keeley et al.  1978) has 
found that AFDC reduces labor force participation,  unlike our finding 
that child support does not. While this may be evidence that child support 
income does not create the same work disincentive  as AFDC, it is also pos- 
sible that women not awarded child support, who are more likely candi- 
dates for AFDC, exhibit a fundamentally different response to nonwage 
income. 
Within the limitations imposed by our data, we found that somewhat 
different factors affect the award of child support than its receipt. The 
likelihood of being awarded child support depends upon the needs of the 
mother and her children, and upon the absent father’s long-term ability to 
pay. There appears also to be substantial racial differences: black women 
are less likely to be awarded support. In contrast, the likelihood of receiv- 
ing child support due depends less upon the race or the circumstances of 
the woman and more upon the current financial well-being of  the ex- 
husband. His income was found to affect whether or not any child sup- 
port is actually paid, but not how much is paid.\Apparently, absent fa- 
thers with low current incomes evade payment altogether, instead of par- 
tially cutting back on payments. This suggests that one effective strategy 
for child support enforcement may be to get nonpaying fathers to pay at 
least some portion of the child support they owe. 
Given the beneficial effects of  child support upon the well-being of 
female-headed families, it is unfortunate that such support is not awarded 
to or received by more divorced mothers and their children. Recent state 
and federal legislation has attempted to improve the enforcement of exist- 
ing child support contracts. In future work we plan to study the effects of 
these new laws on child support receipts. However, no degree of enforce- 
ment can improve the well-being of a family never awarded child support 499  Economic Well-Being of Divorced Women and Their Children 
in the first place. More effort needs to be placed on improving the system 
of awards. Initial work in this direction has been accomplished by Garfinkel 
(1982). Our analysis of determinants may help to provide a foundation 
for improving both the enforcement and award of child support. 
Finally, let us conclude with an appeal for developing better data. The 
March/April 1979 CPS Match File (or the forthcoming 1982 version) re- 
presents the most comprehensive data base yet assembled for studying the 
determinants and consequences of child support payments, but it is far 
from ideal. We have argued that the award and receipt of child support de- 
pend upon both the needs of the mother-only family and the ability of the 
absent father to provide support. While data on  the former are abundant, 
data on the latter are limited to a few responses provided by the woman. 
An ideal data set would match responses obtained directly from the woman 
on her family’s well-being with responses obtained directly from her ex- 
husband on his financial condition. In assessing the impact of child sup- 
port and alimony payments upon remarriage and labor supply, we were 
limited to data pertaining to the previous year only. An ideal data set 
would include a more complete history of family support awarded and re- 
ceived. It would include data on family support due and received in the 
year prior to remarriage for remarried women. It would also include the 
amount of family support awarded at the time of the divorce or separa- 
tion, as well as whether the award was subsequently readjusted, and if so, 
why, and by how much. These data would permit us to investigate more 
fully the impact of past receipts (or nonreceipts) on  current behavior of in- 
dividuals in families headed by women. 
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- Table 15.A.1 (continued) 
All Ever-Divorced  Women Supposed to  Women Who Have Been  Currently Divorced 
or Currently  Receive Child Support in  Women Who Received  Divorced at Least N  or Separated 
Separated Women  1978  Child Support in 1978  Years  Women 
Nonblack  Black  All races  All races  N=2  N=5  N=lO  All Races 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
'For  currently divorced women only. 
bSample size is 1,907. 
'Sample  size is 373. 
dSample size is 1,453. 
'Sample  size is 1,253. 
'Sample size is 1,345. 
Gample size is 1,069. 
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Table U.A.2  Definition of Variables 







































1 if child support is awarded and 0 otherwise. 
1 if  child support is received and 0 otherwise. 
number of  years of  school completed by the woman. 
1 if woman is a college graduate and 0 otherwise. 
1 if woman is of Spanish origin and 0 otherwise. 
1 if woman lives in the Northeast and 0 otherwise. 
1 if woman lives in North Central states and 0 otherwise. 
1 if woman lives in the South and 0 otherwise. 
1 if woman lives within an SMSA and 0 otherwise. 
1 if  woman lives within the central city of an SMSA and 0 
number of  children under twenty-one, fathered or adopted by 
PMERNR squared. 
1 if  there are one or more children age six to seventeen present 
and 0 otherwise. 
number of the mamage that ended in divorce. 
1 for remarried women and 0 otherwise. 
woman’s age at divorce. 
duration of  the mamage that ended in divorce. 
1 for currently separated women and 0 otherwise. 
index of property settlement with 0 = none; 1 = less than 
otherwise. 
ex-husband, who are living with their mother. 
$5,000; 2  = $5,000-9,999;  3 = 
29,999;  5 = $30,000-39,999;  6 = $40,000-49,999; 
7  = $50,000-74,999;  8 = $75,000 plus. 
$10,000-19,999;  4  = $20,000- 
1 if  woman is black and 0 otherwise. 
years since the divorce. 
1 if the divorce occurred since January  1978 and 0 otherwise. 
1 if ex-husband has other children to support and 0 otherwise. 
woman’s estimate of  her ex-husband’s income in $5,000 
increments, where  1 equals less than $5,000 and 6 equals 
$25,000 plus. 
woman’s current age (April 1979). 
AGE squared. 
1 if  woman has any children not fathered by her ex-husband and 
0 otherwise. 
1 if child support was agreed to voluntarily and 0 otherwise. 
dollars of child support due in  1978. 
dollars of child support received in  1978. 
1 if child support received regularly and 0 otherwise. 
1 if alimony was awarded. 
1 if child support due in 1978 and 0 otherwise. 
CHSUPDUEIPATERNR. 
dollars of alimony due in  1978. 
1 if  alimony is due in  1978 and 0 otherwise. 
dollars of alimony received in 1978. 
maximum monthly AFDC payments by state and number of 
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KIDLT3  = number of children under three years old. 
KIDLT6  =  number of children under six years old. 
KIDLTl8  =  number of children under eighteen years old. 
NADULT  =  number of adults in the household. 
OTHFINC  =  total family income excluding child support received, alimony 
=  1 if woman was working or looking for work in March 1979 and 
received, and public assistance income. 
COInment  Irwin Garfinkel 
“Variations in the Economic Well-Being of Divorced Women and Their 
Children” by Andrea H. Beller and John W.  Graham reports on a series 
of empirical investigations motivated by the observation that the economic 
well-being of  divorced women is effected primarily by how much they 
work, how much child support and alimony they receive, and whether or 
not they remarry. Although the chapter examines the determinants of re- 
marriage and labor force participation as well as the determinants of child 
support, the central focus is on child support. When child support is not 
the dependent variable, it is the key independent variable. This focus 
makes the chapter both original and interesting. 
In view of the focus on child support, the data set used, the March/April 
1979 Match File of the Current Population Survey (CPS), is appropriate. 
The April 1979 CPS contained a special supplement that gathered data 
from all women eighteen years of age or older on potential child support 
eligibility, child support and alimony awards and payments, property set- 
tlements, and the income of absent fathers as reported by custodial moth- 
ers. Data from the April supplement were matched with the March 1979 
CPS. 
Beller and Graham limit their sample to ever-divorced and separated 
women. They estimate: (1)  the probability of receiving a child support 
award; (2) conditional upon having an award, the probability that child 
support is received; (3) conditional  upon receiving some support, the 
amount of support received; (4) the probability of remarriage within two, 
five, and ten years of divorce; and (5)  the probability of labor force par- 
ticipation. In all regressions, they use maximum likelihood to estimate lo- 
gistic functions. Their independent variables include age, race, location, 
Irwin Garfinkel is director of the School of Social Work and a research fellow at the Insti- 
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number of children, several variables on marital history, a host of varia- 
bles on  child support, alimony and property settlements, and the custodial 
parents estimate of the absent father’s income. The last is available for 
only one-third of the sample. 
In summarizing their results, Beller and Graham stress three. First, a 
child support award is a function both of the absent father’s ability to pay 
and the needs of the children and custodial mother, while child support 
payments depend primarily  on the current financial status of  the ex- 
husband. With respect to the second and third conclusion on remarriage 
and labor force participation, respectively, I quote from the conclusion 
“Like other forms of  nonlabor income, child support payments were 
found to lower the probability of remarriage. But unlike other forms of 
nonlabor income, child support payments were found to raise labor force 
participation.” I have trouble with all three major conclusions. 
The most important piece of evidence in support of the contention that 
the needs of the children and custodial parent have no effect on child sup- 
port payments is that remarriage of the custodial mother has no effect on 
the probability of receiving child support. Note, however, that they find 
that remarriage significantly decreases the amount of child support re- 
ceived for those who receive any at all. So at best the evidence they present 
is ambiguous. More important, by restricting the sample used to estimate 
the probability of receiving child support to  those who were due support in 
1978, the effects of remarriage on the probability of receiving child sup- 
port are underestimated. Of all those who received child support awards 
at divorce about 20 percent responded that they were not due child sup- 
port in 1978. The CPS did not ask respondents to explain the discrepancy. 
I have been puzzled about this off and on for quite some time. Two rea- 
sons are that the child was over age eighteen or twenty-one and therefore 
no longer eligible for support or that the ex-husband had subsequently 
died. After reading and puzzling over the Beller-Graham paper for the sec- 
ond or third time, I realized that a third and for this paper a critical reason 
was that the custodial parent had remarried. Child support awards may be 
adjusted any time there is a significant change in circumstances. In some 
cases, the new husband may formally adopt the children thereby legally 
releasing the absent father from any financial obligation. Even without 
formal adoption, the parties may agree to end the support obligation of the 
absent father. In any case, although remarried women make up just a bit 
over one-third of all those with support awards in the CPS, they account 
for one-half of all those with awards who are due no support in 1978. 
One final comment on the conclusion that child support payments are 
unrelated  to the needs of  the custodial parent.  Most absent parents, 
judges, researchers, and other people, would be reluctant to conclude that 
need has little effect on payments when the current income of the custodial 
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Although Beller and Graham assert that child support payments reduce 
remarriage and increase labor force participation, the results they report 
show significant effects on remarriage and labor force participation, not 
of child support payments but rather of child support awards at divorce or 
eligibility for support in 1978. Normally economists are concerned with 
the influence of income and prices on behavior. Child support payments 
are a form of income. Child support awards are obligations or promises. 
What the Beller-Graham analysis sheds light on, therefore, is not the ef- 
fect of a particular kind of income on behavior but rather the effect on be- 
havior of promises, promises, promises. No theoretical justification for 
their use of promises rather than payments is presented. Indeed, they treat 
the two as if they are interchangeable. As we shall see, however, they are 
not. 
Beller and Graham find that having a child support award increases the 
probability of remarriage, while being due support in 1978 decreases the 
probability of remarriage by a larger amount than the award increases it. 
If as discussed above remarriage leads some with awards at the time of di- 
vorce to lose eligibility for child support, this is precisely what we would 
expect to find. Imagine that there is no relationship between child support 
awards and remarriage.  By  including dummy variables both for those 
with awards and for those due support in 1978, the awards variable picks 
up the positive correlation between remarrying and losing child support 
eligibility. The child-support-due variable picks up the corresponding neg- 
ative relationship between not remarrying and retaining child support eli- 
gibility. I have no explanation for why the amount of the award per child 
is negatively related to remarriage within five years and unrelated to re- 
marriage within ten years. And it may well be that child support payments 
decrease the probability of remarriage. Beller and Graham provide no evi- 
dence either way. 
Finally, Beller and Graham recognize that in their labor force participa- 
tion equation, the amount of child-support-due variable may be positively 
biased because women expecting to work would negotiate for child sup- 
port rather than alimony. The former is not taxable while the latter is. For 
some reason they never consider that this same bias will lead the alimony- 
expected coefficient to be too negative. More important, given their coun- 
tertheoretical finding that the child-support-due variable is positively cor- 
related with labor force participation, why should we believe that there is 
anything more to this relationship than the bias? Indeed, when a dummy 
for child support due is entered along with a variable measuring child sup- 
port received, the former is positive and significant while the latter is not 
significantly different from zero. A reasonable interpretation is that the 
former picks up most, but not all, of the positive bias. In any case, in this 
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significant relationship between it and labor force participation. Perhaps 
if the child-support-due variable were not included in the regression, there 
would be a positive and significant relationship between payments re- 
ceived and labor force participation. Again Beller and Graham fail to  pre- 
sent evidence on the most important relationship. 
In short, although this chapter deals with an important and interesting 
topic, it suffers from a failure to define clearly the variable of central in- 
terest: child support. This Page Intentionally Left Blank